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This paper investigates the role of informative advertising in creation and augment of market power as well as 
the ability of an advertiser to maximize the value of its economic rent. Informative advertising is considered to 
be a merit good unlike a persuasive one that is mostly associated with a bad. But analysis of the advertisement 
breakdown in Ukraine shows that the share of price advertisements, which are the most beneficial for the public, 
is negligible today. Further still those advertisements are mostly situated in the sectors, where price competition 
is the least strong. Another kind of informative advertising – differentiating advertising – turns from an 
instrument of informing consumers into the vehicle of manipulation of consumer choice. Using the blind tests the 
author has compared the quality and the prices of the range of advertised goods and has found out a low level of 
correlation between the variables. That means that informative advertising serves a function of informing 
consumers inefficiently. At the same time phantom differentiation and misleading advertising proliferation as 
well as informative advertising concentration on experience and credible goods instead search ones testify to 
effective serving a function of maximizing advertiser welfare. 
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There are two approaches to investigation of the role of advertising in the economy. They are direct 
opposite. The first one, which were investigated by Kaldor (Kaldor, 1950), Bain (Bain, 1956), Mitra and Lynch 
(Mitra and Lynch, 1995) and others, grounds the ability of advertising to augment the market power of certain 
firms. Another approach determines advertising as an invaluable mechanism of informing consumers about 
goods and services, their prices and other sales conditions. Among its followers are Telser (Telser, 1964), 
Butters (Butters, 1977), Grossman and Shapiro (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984), etc. The degree of these 
approaches correspondence to reality is considered to be classified by the type of advertising. It is believed that 
persuasive advertising, which is oriented to the deformation of consumer’s utility function, conduces to creation 
and augment of market power, while informative advertising decreases information asymmetry in the market that 
leads to the market power weakening. 
Going with this line of reasoning the author warns about the restrictions of informative advertising 
beneficial effect on the public welfare. This paper theoretically and empirically (on the case of Ukrainian 
economy) investigates the prerequisites of informative advertising economic dysfunction. The author shows the 
ability of informative advertising to create and augment market power of advertiser. The second section is 
devoted to the analysis of price advertising as the most beneficial but the least popular type of advertising. Using 
the example of price advertising in retail the author shows how it can be used for market power augment. The 
third section investigates contradictory impact of differentiating advertising on the market power of advertiser 
and the public welfare as well. Section IV concludes. 
II. PRICE ADVERTISING 
Almost all scientific works which ground the positive impact of advertising on the public welfare 
concentrate on the ability of advertising to spread the information about prices of goods and services, decreasing 
the natural price dispersion thereby. Let us take, for example, the Butters model (Butters, 1977). Starting from 
the market of homogeneous goods Butters argued that the main task of advertising was to inform consumers 
about the prices of the good in different stores. Dealing with the single reserve price m, different sellers send out 
ads at random to buyers. The ads give price and location. Consumers buy the product at the lowest price for 
which they receive an ad, as long as that price does not exceed m. If they receive no ads, or if they receive only 
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ads with prices above m, they buy nothing. Advertising thus creates social gain by allowing mutually beneficial 
trades to occur on the one hand and by decreasing the natural price dispersion on the other hand (Schmalensee, 
1986/ 2003, p.191). Later Grossman and Shapiro broke the restriction of homogeneity, adding into an ad the 
information about store location or product features, which plays the role of differentiation arm in the Salop 
model. (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984). 
The most popular evidence of these models relevance is a variety of studies on prices for glasses, contact 
lenses and ophthalmic services in the USA in the 1950s. According to them the prices were higher by 45 % in 
the states with a ban on these goods advertising versus the states where their advertising was permitted (Scherer 
and Ross, 1990/ 1997, p.568). 
Hence there are two questions: the first one is about the relevancy of the revealed effect expanding from 
the ophthalmic market into the whole economy, and another is about the relevancy of its expanding into modern 
age. To answer them the author has studied the advertisement breakdown in Ukraine in the beginning of 
2013 (Table 1). The study has shown that price ads that are the base of the above mentioned models amounts less 
than 8 %. That means that only 8 % of Ukrainian ads are beneficial for competition development and market 
power restriction. 












TV 200(100) 118 (59) 82 (41) 11 (6) 71 (35) 
Radio 200(100) 84 (42) 116(58) 8 (4) 108 (54) 
Printed 
press 
200(100) 122 (61) 78 (39) 13 (7) 65 (34) 
Internet 200(100) 139 (69) 61 (31) 27 (14) 34 (17) 












* Created on the results of the own empirical study 
Industrial breakdown of price advertisements has shown that retail is a leader of Ukrainian price 
advertising. More than 40 % of investigated price ads advertises for retail services, while retailers are able to 
manipulate of the consumers’ demand not only by persuasive advertising, but also by price one. 
Every good in the supermarket has its own trade margin. The ordinary buyer hardly ever buys only the 
one good there. Being attracted to the supermarket by low price for advertised good he buys also the range of 
other goods which trade margins are certainly higher than the same for advertised good. Hence price advertising 
does not work in the way that was determined by Butters, Grossman and Shapiro. In contrast it increases price 
dispersion in the market and the value of retailers’ economic rent. 
Another argument to exclude retailers’ price ads from the ones that are beneficial for public is the result 
of the author’s previous empirical study on switching the demand between different retailers (Mazaraki, 
Gerasymenko et al, 2011, p.229). It showed that only 37.5 % of customers were willing to switch the demand to 
the store with cheaper goods in response to small but significant and non-transitory increase in price. Only those 
buyers monitored the price ads. Other customers perceive price ads of retailers as persuasive ones, while the 
persuasive advertising is considered to be the most harmful of all. 
It also should be understood, that strong price competition between retailers that theoretically must bring 
low prices and the absence of any market power does not make such an effect in the retail market because it is 
not a field of economic rent extraction. Such a rent is usually extracted by retailers on the upstream market of 
goods delivery for sale. The reason for this shift is information asymmetry. 
Modern retailer distinguishes radically from its predecessor of the middle of last century. Fifty years ago 
famous producers controlled the degree and the quality of consumer awareness through advertising that let them 
dominate the retailers. Toffler wrote that the producers were the middle link in the informational flow between 
consumers and retailers. They knew where, how and whom to sell its own goods that gave them the power to 
impose the full range of sales conditions on retailers. They extracted the economic rent from retailers. 
Contemporary situation is quite opposite. Coding of the goods and introduction of electronic scanning systems 
by retailers has concentrated under their control the fullest information about the consumers’ preferences, 
purchasing power, the best places to allocate and the best ways to promote the good. Now not a producer but a 
retailer has an informational advantage. A retailer extracts an economic rent from a producer today (Toffler, 
1990 /2006). 
So, correction the sample of price ads by excluding the price ads of retailers decreases the share of 
socially beneficial ads to 4.6 %. This figure is too small to excuse the advertising and to ground its positive 
impact on the public welfare. 
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III. DIFFERENTIATING ADVERTISING 
Differentiating advertising is another kind of informative advertising that informs a consumer about the 
features of the product and the sales conditions. Its mission is to explain the differences between similar goods to 
a consumer, to direct him to the best satisfaction of his needs. Some researches argue that differentiating 
advertising decreases natural level of information asymmetry in the market through spreading the information 
about existence of different goods and their ability to substitute each other between consumers. Hence the price 
elasticity of demand for advertised goods increases (Table 3), and the advertiser’s market power weakens.  
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Cady, 1976 empirical drugs  increasing 
Prasad, Ring, 
1976 
experiment canned food decreasing 


























Moriarty, 1983 empirical low price food decreasing 


















* Source: Popkowski Leszczyc and Rao, 1989 
Other researches insist on the opposite effect of differentiating advertising (Table 3). They ground that 
such advertising enhances artificial differentiation of goods, creates the perception of substitutes’ nonidentity, 
and moves them off each other in the coordinates of consumer properties of the good, making the market power 
zones. Explaining this phenomenon Gelman and Salop wrote: “The coca-cola and the Pepsi are likely to be the 
perfect substitutes for uninformed consumers, while the majority of regular consumers of these goods always 
prefer one beverage to another.”(Schmalensee, 1986/ 2003, p.200) 
Notwithstanding the oppositely directed impact of differentiating advertising on price elasticity of 
demand and the risk of market power augment it becomes injurious to the public only in the case when the real 
differentiating is replaced by artificial one, which is created by the efforts of advertising agents. Matsievskyi 
calls it phantom differentiation. (Matsievskyi, 2011). 
The first allusion about the cases of phantom differentiation goes to works of Walras (Walras, 1874 / 
2000, p.377), but the high speed of modern society informatization accelerates the problem. To argue this let us 
look the dynamics of competitive law violations as dissemination of misleading information in Ukraine. For the 
last four years (a dissemination of misleading information was defined as a violation of Ukrainian Act on 
Protection from Unfair Competition by adoption of amendment of 2008) its number has been running up 
monotonous (Fig. 1), taking more than 90 % of the unfair competition cases. 
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Figure 1 – Dynamics of the dissemination of misleading information in Ukraine (2009-2012)* 
* Sources: Antimonopoly Committee’s of Ukraine Annual Reports, 2009-2012 
Phantom differentiation, as an instance of a dissemination of misleading information, limits allocative 
efficiency of the economy. It makes economic agents to exchange scare economic resources not for the real 
utility, but for the illusion of better satisfaction of the need. Investments mostly goes to defray the costs of rent 
seeking (inter alia the advertising costs) and to create the economic rent for market power holders instead the 
stimulation of economic growth. 
Phantom differentiation revealing is a complex task. Sometimes it is impossible to set up the 
correspondence between real features of the good and advertised ones even after its durable consumption. The 
average share of search goods in the product breakdown of Ukrainian advertisements is 36 %. In the group of 
TV advertisements, which are oriented to the biggest audience, it is much lower, being equal to 
11.3 % (Table 4).  
Table 4. Product breakdown of advertisements in Ukraine (January-February, 2013)* 
Source of Ads 
Kind of advertised good 
search experience credible 
TV 11,3 32,4 56,3 
Radio 44,4 51,9 3,7 
Printed press 35,4 47,7 16,9 
Internet 50,0 44,1 5,9 
Billboard 46,2 48,7 5,1 
Total 36,0 45,4 18,6 
* Created on the results of the own empirical study 
So, more than two-thirds of the investigated ads demands at least one purchase of the good to set up the 
correspondence between the information of the ad and real state of being. 19 % of all the ads advertise credible 
goods which relevancy cannot be set up at all. Among them are medical services, drugs, cosmetics, personal 
cleanliness goods, etc. Their impact on human is not well understood. 
Matching the fact of differentiating advertising concentration on the experience and credible goods with 
upward dynamics of dissemination of misleading information the author has revealed the grounds not only for 
market power augment but for its effective exploitation as well. In the contemporary economy of information 
asymmetry an advertiser must not invest in product amendment to raise the price. The Table 5 consist the data to 
confirm this idea. There are results of correlation analysis between prices of certain advertised consumable 
goods and their quality that has been set as the result of three-stage blind tests.  
ECOFORUM 
[Volume 1, Issue 1(1), 2012] 
62 
 













Electric meat mincer 0.59 Blender 0.54 
Mineral flat water -0.94 Cheese  1 
Ice-cream 0.77 Hairdryer 0.49 
Nectar multivit 0.78 Oil heater -0.19 
Pickled champignon 0.24 Servelat 0.08 
Sunflower oil  -0.3 Red caviar 0.83 
Earl grey tea -0.31 Milk 2.5 % 0.83 
Canned corn 0.47 Eggs 0.79 
Water filter (jar) 0.94 Raisins -0.08 
Teflon pan 0.4 Margarine  0.97 
Canned sprats  0.83 Rice 0.76 






Breadmaker 0.31  
Average value of the coefficient of correlation  0.4 
* Created on the results of the own empirical study 
The value of coefficient of correlation fluctuates significantly by product groups. For such goods as 
cheese, margarine and water filters the coefficient of correlation tends to the one, while for orange juice, oil, earl 
grey tea and mineral flat water it is negative. Average value of coefficient of correlation is 0.4. That means a 
rather low level of correlation between variables. 
Of course, advertising cannot be the only one reason of the low level of correlation between price and 
quality of investigated goods. There is a lack of evidences for such a causal relationship. The only one that can 
be set definitely is the inefficiency of information function serving by differentiating advertising. It leads to the 
lack of consumer awareness about the real features of goods and services as a key element of information 
asymmetry and to the augment of market power of information holders. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
Theoretical and empirical analysis of the paper has shown that informative advertising, which is 
considered to be beneficial for public, has turned into the sudden risk zone for every consumer and the whole 
economy as well. Informative advertising today often aims not at informing consumers but at managing the 
individual consumers’ utility functions, at its deforming to maximize welfare of advertiser. In the contemporary 
economy of information asymmetry informative advertising has been losing the features of the source of market 
information rapidly. Now it is rather the mechanism of conscious manipulation of consumer choice aimed the 
creation and augment of market power of an advertiser, the vehicle of its economic rent maximization, than the 
source of market information.  
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